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What	does	self‐deception	tell	us	about	the	self?	A	Sartrean	perspective	
David	Mitchell	
1.	Introduction	
There	is	something	strangely	intimate	about	self‐deception.	That	is,	the	secrets	we	keep	
from	ourselves,	and	our	methods	for	accomplishing	this,	seem	to	go	to	the	heart	of	who	
we	are	in	an	essential	way.	And	so	too	is	this	the	case	for	our	understanding	of	humanity	
in	general.	For,	as	Fingarette	has	noted,	‘were	a	portrait	of	man	to	be	drawn	we	should	
surely	place	well	in	the	foreground	man’s	enormous	capacity	for	self‐deception.’1	Indeed,	
we	might	even	say	 that	man’s	ability	 to	deceive	himself	about	everything	 from	sexual	
desire	to	death,	is	what	fundamentally	distinguishes	him.	And	this	is	not,	as	Morris	has	
suggested,	 merely	 some	 idiosyncrasy	 that	 might	 occur	 ‘from	 time	 to	 time’2.	 In	 other	
words,	 self‐deception	 is	 not	 just	 a	 contingent	 ‘error’	 occasionally	 affixing	 itself	 to	 the	
functioning	of	an	otherwise	rational	self.	Rather,	as	is	the	case	in	our	own	lives,	the	nature	
of	what	we	disguise	points	toward	something	more	significant	about	who	we	are.	In	short,	
in	the	individual	case	and	the	general,	the	secrets	we	hold	from	ourselves	seem	to	offer	a	
unique	road	to	understanding	the	mysteries	of	the	self.	
Yet	this	is	not	we	can	say,	despite	this,	a	possibility	that	many	philosophers	have	taken	
seriously.	And	we	should	ask	why	this	is	so.	That	is,	we	should	ask	why,	given	its	apparent	
significance,	 an	 analysis	 of	 self‐deception	 has	 not	 served	 as	 a	 more	 common	 and	
productive	starting	point	for	grasping	the	nature	of	the	self.	For	whilst,	of	course,	much	
work	has	been	done	on	both	self‐deception	and	selfhood	separately,	the	two	have	rarely	
been	 explored	 properly	 together.	 Or,	 put	 differently,	 self‐deception	 has,	 despite	 its	
popularity	as	an	isolated	topic,	rarely	been	viewed	as	essential	to	an	understanding	of	the	
self.	And	part	of	the	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	apparent	dead	ends	that	result	from	the	
                                                            
1	Fingarette,	Self‐Deception,	1	
2	‘From	time	to	time	people	“lie	to	themselves”,	as	we	say....’	(Morris,	Sartre,	76)	
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theoretical	problems	arising	here.	That	is,	the	reason	for	this	separation	lies	in	the	fact	
that	either	the	problems	of	self‐deception	appear	 intractable,	or	 that	 the	 ‘solutions’	 to	
them	seem	to	succeed	only	by	side‐stepping	what	is	so	potentially	illuminating	about	the	
phenomenon	in	the	first	place.	Consequently	it	is	then	to	gain	an	understanding	of	self‐
deception	and	self‐hood	that	we	must	first	address	what	exactly	these	problems	are.	And	
Sartre	provides	us	with	a	good	place	to	start	on	this	issue.	For	as	he	says,	contrasting	self‐
deception	to	ordinary	deception,	
…the	one	to	whom	the	lie	is	told	and	the	one	who	lies	are	one	and	the	
same	person,	which	means	that	I	must	know	in	my	capacity	as	deceiver	
the	truth	which	is	hidden	from	me	in	my	capacity	as	the	one	deceived.	
Better	yet	I	must	know	the	truth	very	exactly	in	order	to	conceal	it	more	
carefully‐	 and	 this	not	at	 two	different	moments…‐	but	 in	 the	unitary	
structure	of	a	single	project.	(Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness,	49)3	
	
In	other	words,	a	‘lie’	in	general	involves	a	deceiver	who	knows	the	lie	told	is	untrue,	and	
a	deceived	who	does	not	know,	or	believes	the	lie	to	be	true.	And	it	is	apparent	why	this	
is	a	problem	if	the	deceiver	and	the	deceived	are	the	same	person.	This	is	because,	as	Mele	
says,	then,	 ‘self‐deceivers	intentionally	deceive	themselves	into	believing	something,	p,	
and	there	is	a	time	at	which	they	believe	that	p	is	false	while	also	believing	that	p	is	true.’4	
That	is	to	say,	in	the	case	of	a	lie	to	oneself	the	person	must	ostensibly	both	believe	the	
lie,	and	be	aware	of	it	as	a	lie.	And	this	it	seems,	as	Mele	argues,	‘is	not	a	possible	state	of	
mind.’5	In	short,	it	is	not	clear	how	a	lie	in	this	sense	could	possibly	succeed.		
	
	
	
	
2.	Other	theories	of	self‐deception	
                                                            
3	From	here	on		BN	
4	Mele,	‘Emotion	and	desire	in	self‐deception’,	163	
5	Mele,	‘Real	self‐deception’,	92	
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However,	where	does	this	leave	us?	Where	are	we	left	in	our	discussion	when	confronted	
with	this	 ‘paradox’	of	self‐deception?	One	way	of	seeing	things	would	be	to	take	these	
problems	as	intractable	and	give	up	on	self‐evasion	as	a	means	for	shedding	light	on	the	
self.	Another	though,	would	be	to	try	and	show	how	potential	resolutions	to	such	puzzles	
might	in	fact	allow	us	to	see	the	self	and	its	relation	to	the	world	in	a	new	way.	That	is,	in	
addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 self‐deception	 is	 possible	 we	 would	 seek	 to	 reveal	
something	new	and	distinctive	 about	 our	understanding	of	 the	 self.	And	 certainly	 the	
Freudian	resolution	to	the	problem	appears	to	offer	precisely	just	that.	This	is	because	
Freud’s	 account	 of	 the	 unconscious	not	 only	 presents	 a	 radical	 view	of	 self‐hood,	 but	
seems	to	solve	the	paradox	just	outlined.	That	is,	Freud’s	theory	solves	the	puzzle	of	self‐
deception	by,	as	Sartre	explains,	replacing	‘the	duality	of	the	deceiver	and	the	deceived,	
the	essential	condition	of	the	lie,	by	that	of	the	“id”	and	the	“ego”’.	(BN,	51)	And	this	works	
since	the	unconscious	can	then	‘lie’	to	the	conscious	mind,	or	withhold	secrets	from	it,	
without	the	conscious	mind	being	aware	of	the	subterfuge.	All	that	is	apparently	required	
for	this	is	that	the	secrets	or	truths	to	be	withheld	are	subject	to	a	process	of	‘repression’.	
For,	as	Freud	has	stated,	‘the	essence	of	repression	lies	simply	in	the	function	of	rejecting	
and	keeping	something	out	of	consciousness.’6	
	
Unfortunately	 though,	 it	 is	 this	 very	process	which	 is	 problematic.	 In	 other	words,	 in	
order	that	repression	can	occur	there	must	be	something	determining	which	drives	from	
the	id	are	to	be	repressed	and	which	permitted	into	consciousness.	And,	as	Sartre	says,	
‘we	are	compelled	to	admit	that	the	censor	must	choose…’	(BN,	52)	Yet	it	is	also	apparent	
that	 if	 the	censor	is	choosing	 ‘It	must	be	the	consciousness	(of)	being	conscious	of	the	
drive	to	be	repressed,	but	precisely	in	order	not	to	be	conscious	of	it.’	(Ibid)	Put	differently,	
in	order	that	the	censor	can	choose	between	what	is	permitted	and	what	is	not,	it	must	
be	aware	of	that	which	it	is	repressing.	And	in	this	way	the	censor	must	be	an	awareness	
both	of	 the	 repression	and,	 as	 it	 is	 connected	 to	 consciousness,	 ignorant	 of	 the	 act	 of	
repression.	 Thus	 in	 this	 way	we	 are	 back	 with	 the	 puzzle	 of	 self‐deception.	 For	 it	 is	
unclear	 then	 how	 the	 censor	 can	 in	 turn	 repress,	 in	 the	 very	moment	 of	 repression,	
awareness	of	what	it	is	doing.	
                                                            
6	Freud,	‘Repression’,	from	Goleman,	Vital	Lies,	Simple	Truths,	112	
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Little	wonder	then	that	given	this	some	theorists	have	suggested	the	paradox	can	have	
no	resolution.	Rather	they	contend,	as	Mele	says,	 ‘that	the	attempt	to	understand	self‐
deception	 on	 the	 model	 of	 paradigmatic	 interpersonal	 deception	 is	 fundamentally	
misguided.’7	That	is,	for	them,	puzzles	of	‘self‐deception’	stem	from	illegitimately	framing	
the	 phenomenon	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 deceiver‐deceived	 relation	 of	 the	 ordinary	 lie.	 And	
Canfield	and	Gustafson	are	typical	in	this	regard.	For	they	argue	that	‘All	that	happens	in	
self‐deception…	 is	 that	 the	 person	 believes	 or	 forgets	 something	 in	 [belief	 adverse]	
circumstances.’8	 In	other	words,	when	we	say	we	are	 ‘self‐deceived’	we	are	really	 just	
adopting	an	erroneous	belief	which,	given	the	evidence,	it	is	unreasonable	to	have.	And	
likewise	Mele	develops	this	point	when	he	says	that	‘Beliefs	that	we	are	self‐deceived	in	
acquiring	or	retaining	are	a	species	of	biased	belief.’9	In	short,	self‐deceiving	beliefs	are	
beliefs	we	acquire	due	to	a	strong	emotional	desire	for	something	to	be	true,	and	in	which	
evidence	is	twisted	to	suit	this	end.	
Thus	it	is	clear,	with	this,	that	the	paradox	is	then	resolved.	If	we	simply	come	to	hold	a	
questionable	belief,	due	to	a	persistently	selective	relation	to	evidence,	then	we	can	be	
‘self‐deceived’	in	this	sense	without	having	to	be	simultaneously	aware	and	not	aware	of	
a	lie.	Yet	it	is	also	clear	that	this	approach	is	unsatisfying.	That	is	to	say	that,	whilst	getting	
round	 the	 puzzles	 of	 self‐deception,	 the	 ‘deflationary’	 strategy	 also	 seems	 to	 miss	
something	essential	about	the	phenomenon.	Pedrini	touches	on	this	when	he	talks	about	
‘a	distinction	between	self‐deception	and	motivationally	biased	beliefs.’10	But	it	is	Bach	
who	most	succinctly	captures	what	it	is	missing	when	he	points	out	that	such	a	view	‘does	
not	reckon	with	the	fact	that	in	self‐deception	the	truth	is	dangerously	close	at	hand	and	
must	be	repeatedly	suppressed.’11	In	other	words,	there	is	a	difference	between	avoiding	
a	 certain	 truth	 which	 immanently	 threatens	 consciousness,	 and	 gradually	 coming	 to	
affirm	an	error.	For,	whilst	the	latter	may	be	called	‘self‐deception’,	it	clearly	differs	from	
instances	where	we	turn	immediately	from	disturbing	thoughts	that	come	to	mind.	In	one	
                                                            
7	Mele,	‘Real	Self‐deception’,	91	
8	Canfield	and	Gustafson,	35,	see	Fingarette,	Self‐Deception,	22	
9	Mele,	‘Real	Self‐deception,	93	
10	Pedrini,‘Self‐Deception:	What	is	To	Blame	After	All’,	151	
11	Bach,	‘Thinking	and	believing	in	self‐deception’,	105	
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case	 we	 have	 a	 spurious	 belief	 accrued	 and	 cemented	 potentially	 over	 many	 years,	
whereas	with	the	other	we	have	an	immediate	act	of	distraction	from	something	that	is	
all	too	present.	And	in	this	sense	it	is	evident	here	that	something	essential	has	not	been	
dealt	 with.	 In	 sum,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 the	 deflationary	 accounts	 have	 resolved	 the	
paradoxes	only	by	ignoring	a	significant	part	of	the	meaning	of	self‐deception.	
So	 is	 there	 another	 possibility?	 Is	 there	 an	 alternative	 beyond	 the	 Freudian	 or	
deflationary	answers	to	the	puzzle	of	self‐deception?	And	thus	is	there	another	way	of	
using	an	analysis	of	how	self‐deception	is	possible	to	shed	light	on	the	self?		Before	we	
discuss	 Sartre’s	 attempted	 answers	 to	 such	 questions,	 it	 is	 worth	 looking	 at	 what	
Fingarette	has	to	say.	For	unlike	the	deflationary	accounts	he	does	use	the	problem	to	say	
something	new	about	the	self,	as	well	as	more	properly	engaging	with	the	experiential	
reality	of	self‐deception.	Further,	he	does	this	by	first	arguing	that	we	can	understand	the	
lie	to	oneself	by	distinguishing	between	two	modes	of	consciousness.	Corresponding	to	
Sartre’s	notion	of	the	reflective	and	pre‐reflective,	this	can	be	framed	as	the	difference	
between	conscious	or	explicit	 ‘attention’	and	absorbed	or	non‐focused	awareness.	And	
Fingarette	uses	the	example	of	writing	to	clarify	this	point.	As	he	says,	‘when	I	am	writing	
as	I	normally	do,	I	take	account	of	the	complex	and	varying	physical	and	orthographical	
requirements	for	putting	my	thoughts	on	paper,	but	I	do	not	focus	my	attention	on	these	
things.’12	 In	 other	words,	we	 can	 be	 aware	 of	 different	 aspects	 of	 an	 activity,	 and	 its	
surrounding	 context,	 without	 necessarily	 making	 either	 a	 reflective	 ‘theme’	 for	
consciousness.	And,	critically,	we	can	do	all	this	whilst	being	potentially	still	able	at	any	
moment	to	explicitly	thematise	a	salient	object	in	our	environment.	
But	how	does	this	then	help	solve	the	puzzle	of	self‐deception?	And	how	does	this	in	turn	
reveal	something	new	about	the	self?	Part	of	the	answer	lies	in	that	very	point	just	stated,	
that	we	exercise	a	certain	pre‐reflective	control	over	what	we	make	reflectively	explicit.	
In	different	words,	as	Fingarette	says,	‘we	actively	and	selectively	direct	our	attention	on	
the	basis	of	reasons	provided	by	our	appraisal	of	our	situation.’	(Ibid,	168)	And	this	is	
significant	if	we	consider	that	explicitly	focusing	on	certain	things	can	be	painful.	Say,	I	
feel	shame	for	something	I	did	the	previous	evening.	On	a	pre‐reflective	level	we	can	avoid	
thematising	this.	This	is	because,	as	Fingarette	argues,	‘I	can	take	account	of	my	situation	
                                                            
12	Fingarette,	‘Self‐deception	needs	no	explaining’,	in	Self‐Deception,	163	
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and	detect	a	condition	which	is	relevant	to	my	interests,	but	which	would	gravely	disrupt	
my	mental	 equilibrium	 if	my	attention	were	 to	 focus	on	 it.’	 (Ibid,	 169)	And	what	 this	
means	is	that	on	a	pre‐reflective	level	we	can	have	an	embryonic	sense	of	something	as	
being	potentially	distressing	if	it	were	brought	to	focused	awareness.	Thus	this	sense	in	
turn	allows	us	pre‐reflectively	to	withhold	attention	from	the	potentially	painful	object.	
Consequently	we	 can	 say,	 on	 this	 basis,	we	 can	 then	deceive	ourselves	without	being	
entangled	in	paradox.	For	if	we	can	withhold	attention	from	an	intentional	object	in	pre‐
reflective	 awareness	 that	 is	 of	 obvious	 potential	 reflective	 interest	 to	 us,	we	 are	 self‐
deceiving.	Yet	as	all	this	occurs	without	our	ever	being	reflectively	aware	of	the	thing	we	
are	avoiding	then	there	is	also	no	obvious	paradox	involved.	In	short,	there	is	no	paradox	
as	 we	 can	 ‘turn	 away’	 from	 the	 potentially	 distressing	 object	 without	 having	 to	 be	
explicitly	aware	of	the	strategy	and	intention	of	our	avoidance.	
	
3.	Sartre	and	the	Coquette	
Returning	to	our	argument	therefore	it	seems	that	Fingarette	has	indeed	answered	the	
questions	raised.	This	is	the	case	since	he	has	indicated	how	the	puzzle	of	self‐deception	
might	be	solved	and	concomitantly	revealed	something	about	the	self’s	relation	to	the	
world.	However,	his	explanation	still	remains	only	partial.	For,	whilst	Fingarette	takes	us	
further	than	the	Freudian	or	deflationary	accounts,	he	still	leaves	the	problem	of	a	certain	
kind	of	self‐deceiving	relatively	untouched.	In	other	words,	whilst	explaining	how	self‐
deception	is	possible	in	our	everyday	dealings	with	the	world	he	does	not	adequately	do	
this	regarding	a	mode	of	more	exceptional	self‐deception.	That	is,	his	account	seems	more	
applicable	 to	 a	 general	 self‐deceiving	 ‘evasion’	 of	 truth,	 rather	 than	 specific	 and	
immediate	acts	of	self‐deception.	And	it	is	for	this	reason	then	that,	as	Sartre	says,	‘If	we	
wish	to	get	out	of	this	difficulty,	we	should	examine	more	closely	the	patterns	of	bad	faith	
and	attempt	a	description	of	them.’	(BN,	55)	Put	differently,	it	is	for	this	reason,	that	we	
must	 now	 give	 a	 more	 thorough,	 phenomenological,	 account	 of	 such	 an	 act.	 Or,	 to	
elaborate	again,	it	is	for	this	reason	we	must	give	an	account	of	that	self‐deception	Sartre	
calls	‘bad	faith’;	the	state	of	a	consciousness	contradicting	itself	within	a	specific	moment.	
For	one	limitation	of	previous	theories	is	that	they	have	taken	the	phenomenon	of	self‐
deception	for	granted.	That	is	to	say,	they	have	overlooked	the	descriptive	specificities	
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and	subtleties	of	what	actually	happens	in	a	concrete	situation	involving	such	an	act.	And	
it	is	because	of	this	that	they	have	struggled	to	resolve	the	paradox	of	the	lie	to	oneself.	
Consequently	it	is	to	properly	resolve	this	problem,	and	to	gain	a	deeper	understanding	
of	the	self,	that	we	must	instead	look	to	do	what	they	have	not.	In	sum,	it	is	for	this	reason	
that	we	must	return	to	a	concrete	case	of	immediate	self‐deception,	to	effectively	describe	
it,	and	to	draw	out	what	is	actually	going	on	there.	
Yet	where	do	we	begin	in	this	enterprise?	Following	Sartre,	we	start	with	a	description	of	
what	Stevenson	calls	a	 ‘charming	little	cafe	scene’.13	And	this	involves	a	coquette	 ‘who	
has	consented	to	go	out	with	a	particular	man	for	the	first	time.’	(BN,	55)	Furthermore	
the	general	context	in	which	she	falls	into	self‐deception	is	that	‘she	does	not	quite	know	
what	she	wants.’	(Ibid)	That	is	to	say,	she	is	aware	of	the	man’s	sexual	interest	in	her	and	
of	 the	 decision	 she	 will	 be	 compelled	 to	 make	 regarding	 it	 but,	 because	 of	 her	
ambivalence,	wants	to	pretend	that	nothing	is	being	asked	of	her.	The	critical	question	
for	our	account	then	is	how	she	accomplishes	this.	And	the	answer,	first	of	all,	is	that	she	
suppresses	the	temporal,	transcendent,	aspect	implicit	in	the	situation.	Or,	put	another	
way,	she	ignores,	in	‘transcendence’,	that	which	is	constitutively	part	of	the	situation	but	
not	explicitly	seen,	or	‘immanent’.	What	this	means	concretely	then	is	that	she	ignores	the	
way	 the	man’s	 conduct	 towards	her	 is	 leading	up	 towards	what	 Sartre	 calls	 ‘the	 first	
approach’	(BN,	55),	the	initiation	of	physical	intimacy.	And	she	achieves	this	by	making	
totally	immanent	those	aspects	of	his	behaviour	which	allude	to	possibilities	beyond	their	
immediate	signification.	As	Sartre	says	then	‘She	restricts	this	behaviour	to	what	is	in	the	
present;	she	does	not	wish	to	read	in	the	phrases	which	he	addresses	to	her	anything	
other	than	their	explicit	meaning.’	(Ibid)	So,	for	instance,	when	he	says	to	her	‘you	have	
beautiful	hair’	she	interprets	this	as	just	referring	to	a	statement	of	fact	and	to	the	man’s	
charming	character.	
Thus,	 continuing	 our	 description,	 in	 this	way	 the	woman	 disarms	 the	 situation	 of	 its	
worrying,	 transcendent,	 aspect	 and	 evades	 the	 decision	 which	 this	 transcendence	
implies.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 she	 does	 not	 want	 to	 deny	 the	 sexual	 element	 in	 the	
situation	altogether.	As	Sartre	says,	‘she	would	find	no	charm	in	a	respect	which	would	
be	only	respect.’	(Ibid)	And	it	is	this	that	distinguishes	her	as	a	coquette.	For	whilst	‘desire	
                                                            
13	Stevenson,	‘Sartre	on	Bad	faith’,	256	
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cruel	and	naked	would	humiliate	and	horrify	her’	(Ibid),	she	at	the	same	time	enjoys	the	
excitement	which	his	desire	and	the	concomitant	sense	of	sexual	possibility	lends	to	the	
scene.	Consequently	the	coquette	again	engages	in	a	move	with	which	to	maintain	these	
contradictory	wishes.	As	Sartre	explains,	 ‘This	time	then	she	refuses	to	apprehend	the	
desire	for	what	it	is;	she	does	not	even	give	it	a	name;	she	recognises	it	only	to	the	extent	
that	 it	 transcends	 itself	 toward	admiration,	esteem,	respect.’(Ibid)	 In	other	words,	her	
response	now	is	the	inverse	of	what	it	was	in	relation	to	the	transcendent	possibilities	
latent	in	the	man’s	conduct.	That	is	to	say,	just	as	there	the	coquette	stripped	his	conduct	
of	all	transcendence,	at	this	moment	she	strips	his	desire	of	all	immanence.	For	what	she	
does	then,	in	relation	to	this	desire,	is	to	transform	it	into	a	pure	transcendent.	In	other	
words,	she	purges	it	of	its	bodily	aspect,	and	sees	in	it	only	a	lofty	‘concern’	for	her.	And	
in	 this	 fashion	 therefore	 she	 succeeds	 in	 enjoying	 the	 excitement	 and	 tension	 of	 the	
moment	whilst	avoiding	the	brute	fact	of	sexuality	and	the	choice	it	necessitates.	
	
Nevertheless,	in	Sartre’s	example,	her	artful	dancing	around	the	situation	in	this	way	and	
the	choice	it	demands	of	her	does	not	end	there.	For,	‘suppose	he	takes	her	hand.’	(BN,	
55)	Such	an	action,	we	can	say,	now	threatens	her	carefully	constructed	evasions	because	
it	seems	to	demand	an	immediate	choice	on	her	part.	In	other	words,	if	she	leaves	her	
hand	there	she	is	implicitly	consenting	to	his	advance.	Conversely	though,	if	she	removes	
it,	as	Sartre	points	out,	she	would	‘break	the	troubled	and	unstable	harmony	which	gives	
the	hour	its	charm.’	(BN,	55)	Consequently	in	her	bid	to	both	postpone	a	decision,	and	to	
maintain	the	élan	of	the	moment	constituted	by	sexual	possibility,	she	engages	in	a	final	
procedure	of	evasion.	What	is	this?	As	Sartre	describes	it,	‘the	young	woman	leaves	her	
hand	there,	but	she	does	not	notice	that	she	is	leaving	it.’	(BN,	55‐56)	And	she	achieves	
this	by	applying	to	her	own	being	a	similar	strategy	that	she	used	for	the	man’s	desire.	
That	 is	 to	 say,	 she	 strips	 her	 being	 of	 all	 immanence	 and	 imagines	 she	 is	 pure	
transcendence.	Engaging	in	lofty	‘sentimental	speculation’	(BN,	56)	about	the	nature	of	
life,	she	enacts	a	separation	from	her	body	and	discloses	herself	as	being,	essentially,	only	
a	consciousness.	Thus	by	doing	this	she	abdicates	responsibility	for	her	hand.	That	is,	the	
hand,	now	not	being	truly	part	of	her,	becomes	merely	a	passive	object	in	relation	to	which	
the	man’s	touch	can	carry	no	significance.	
Concluding	 then,	 the	 coquette	 succeeds	 here,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 other	 two	 devices,	 in	
evading	 the	 decision	which	 the	 situation	 seemed	 to	 demand	 of	 her.	 In	 this	 way,	 she	
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succeeds	in	both	enjoying	the	peculiar	tension	the	man’s	desire	lends	to	the	scene	whilst	
at	the	same	avoiding	confronting	that	desire	and	the	choice	it	implies.	And	Sartre	says,	as	
such	‘We	shall	say	that	this	woman	is	in	bad	faith.’	(Ibid)	But	why	to	clarify	is	this	the	
case?	Or,	rather,	why	is	she	self‐deceived?	And	what,	to	return	to	the	general	concern	of	
our	 discussion,	 has	 been	 gleaned	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 from	 such	 a	
description?	To	take	the	former	questions	first,	we	can	say	that	the	woman	is	in	a	state	of	
self‐deception	because	she	hides	 from	herself	 something	at	 the	very	moment	 that	she	
brings	it	to	attention.	So	for	instance,	in	the	case	of	the	man’s	conduct,	she	reduces	it	to	
being	 only	 its	 immanent	 meaning	 precisely	 because	 she	 is	 aware	 of	 its	 threatening	
transcendence.	 That	 is,	 she	 reduces	 the	 intimation	 of	 future	 physical	 contact	 in	 his	
conduct	to	a	purely	immediate	meaning.	And	she	does	this	precisely	because	she	is	aware	
of	what	his	behaviour	signifies.	Likewise,	it	is	because	when	the	man	touches	her	hand	
she	senses	‘profoundly	the	presence	of	her	own	body...’	that	‘...she	realizes	herself	as	not	
being	 her	 own	body.’	 (Ibid)	 In	 short,	 the	woman	 is	 in	 bad	 faith	 because	 she	not	 only	
attempts	to	deceive	herself,	but	because	she	does	so	at	the	very	moment	that	awareness	
of	that	thing	to	be	avoided	seems	unavoidable.	
	
However,	we	may	now	wonder,	to	look	at	our	second	question,	whether	we	have	thereby	
made	any	progress	in	understanding	how	this	phenomenon	is	intelligible.	That	is	to	say,	
if	a	description	of	this	immediate	concrete	self‐deception	was	supposed	to	show	how	the	
puzzles	of	self‐deception	could	be	resolved	are	we	not	still	left	with	our	central	problem?	
In	short,	are	we	not	still	left	with	the	problem	of	how	such	a	contradictory	state	of	self‐
evading	consciousness	can	be	maintained?	In	one	sense	‘yes’,	in	so	far	as	this	description	
has	not	in	itself	yielded	all	the	necessary	answers.	However,	in	another	sense,	we	can	also	
say	 we	 have	 made	 some	 progress.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 since,	 considered	 properly,	 this	
phenomenological	description	has,	in	revealing	something	about	the	self,	pointed	the	way	
to	a	possible	answer	to	our	problem.		
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And	what	this	is,	and	that	which	we	can	take	up	as	a	guiding	thread	towards	an	answer,	
is	the	nature	and	relation	of	facticity	and	transcendence.	14	For,	as	Sartre	says,	‘The	basic	
concept	which	is	thus	engendered,	utilizes	the	double	property	of	the	human	being,	who	
is	 at	 once	 a	 facticity	and	 a	 transcendence.’	 (BN,	 56)	What	 this	means	 then	 is	 that	 the	
woman	somehow	succeeds	in	her	self‐deception,	as	we	have	seen,	because	she	is	able	to	
exploit	something	about	this	relation.	To	explain,	she	is	able	 to	deny	the	nature	of	the	
situation	just	as	she	is	aware	of	 it,	because	she	can	exploit	the	fact	that	man	is	neither	
entirely	facticity	nor	transcendence.	So,	for	example,	her	strategy	of	separating	herself	
from	her	body,	when	her	hand	is	touched,	works	because	in	one	sense	it	is	true	that	she	
is	not	her	body.	Or,	put	differently,	her	strategy	works	because	on	one	level	human	reality	
always	 transcends	 its	 facticity.	 Conversely,	 she	 succeeds	 in	 denying	 the	 temporal,	
transcendent,	aspect	of	the	man’s	behaviour	because	it	is	also	true	that	man’s	conduct,	in	
a	sense,	is	what	it	is.	That	is,	it	is	true	that	in	one	sense	we	are	not	our	future,	transcendent,	
possibilities.	
	
As	such	then,	the	aspect	of	the	transcendence‐facticity	relation	which	she	is	able	to	exploit	
is	that	man,	as	Sartre	argues,	‘is	not	what	he	is,	and	is	what	he	is	not.’	(BN,	67)15	If	man	
were	 straightforwardly	 self‐identical,	 and	 just	 was	 either	 his	 body	 or	 disembodied	
consciousness,	such	strategies	would	not	be	possible.	And	in	this	way	it	is	man’s	‘double	
property’,	his	non‐coincidence	with	himself,	which	must	serve	as	the	guiding	thread	in	
understanding	self‐deception.	But	then	where	do	we	go	in	terms	of	exploring	this	aspect	
of	man	in	relation	to	self‐deception?	Further,	where	do	we	thus	go	in	terms	of	grasping	
how	 such	 strategies	 of	 radical	 self‐evasion	 can	 work?	 Sartre	 says	 now	 that	 ‘A	 quick	
examination	of	the	idea	of	sincerity,	the	antithesis	of	bad	faith	will	be	very	instructive	in	
this	connection.’	(BN,	58)	Why	sincerity?	Sincerity,	the	ideal	that	 ‘a	man	be	 for	himself	
only	what	he	is’	(Ibid)	seems	essentially	connected	to	the	relation	between	self‐deception	
and	man’s	non‐self‐coincidence.	As	such	although	the	‘concept	of	transcendence‐facticity’	
(BN,	57)	discloses	something	about	man’s	non‐self‐identity,	it	remains	only	a	particular	
                                                            
14	Stevenson,	‘Sartre	on	Bad	faith’,	attempts	in	contrast	to	understand	bad	faith	in	terms	
of	Sartre’s	reflective‐	pre‐reflective	distinction,	256‐257.	This	effort	is	then	criticised	by	
M.	Hymers,	‘Bad	Faith’	397‐402.	
15	Also	BN,	58	and	63	
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mode	of	this.	In	short,	being	only	a	particular	mode	of	man’s	‘non‐being’	it	cannot	reveal	
its	whole	truth.	And	this	means	that	if	we	want	to	explore	this	more	fundamental	relation	
of	non‐self‐identity	to	self‐deception,	we	have	to	look	beyond	that	specific	case.	We	have,	
in	brief,	to	look	to	the	more	universal	aspiration	of	sincerity.	And	by	doing	this	we	then	
hope	to	show	how	the	puzzles	of	self‐deception	might	be	resolved.	
	
4.	Sincerity,	the	waiter,	and	the	impossible	ideal	
So	then,	to	continue	our	exploration	of	self‐deception	we	have	to	look	more	closely	at	the	
nature	of	man’s	non	self‐identity.	In	particular,	we	have	to	look	at	his	‘not	being	what	he	
is’,	and	do	this	by	 investigating	the	general	project	of	sincerity.	How	in	turn	are	we	to	
accomplish	this?	Sartre	begins	by	noting	that	sincerity	is	‘not	merely	an	ideal	of	knowing	
but	 an	 ideal	 of	 being.’	 (BN,	 59)	 In	 other	 words,	 sincerity	 is	 not,	 as	 much	 of	 the	
contemporary	 literature	 on	 self‐deception	 suggests,	 purely	 a	 case	 of	 what	 we	 say	 or	
believe,	but	a	pursuit.	That	is,	sincerity	is	a	project	we	actively	try	to	realise	in	our	lives.	
And	it	is	for	this	reason	again,	that	Sartre	turns	to	a	concrete	description	of	such	a	pursuit	
to	explore	what	‘sincerity’	means	in	this	case.	That	is,	he	turns	to	the	example	of	the	waiter	
in	the	cafe.	For	such	a	waiter	is	evidently	trying	to	‘become	what	he	is.’	As	Sartre	indicates,	
	
His	movement	is	quick	and	forward,	a	little	too	precise,	a	little	too	rapid.	
He	 comes	 toward	 the	patrons	with	a	 step	a	 little	 too	quick.	He	bends	
forward	a	little	too	eagerly;	his	voice,	his	eyes	express	an	interest	a	little	
too	 solicitous	 for	 the	 order	 of	 the	 customer.	 Finally	 there	 he	 returns,	
trying	 to	 imitate	 in	 his	 walk	 the	 inflexible	 stiffness	 of	 some	 kind	 of	
automaton	while	carrying	his	tray	with	the	recklessness	of	a	tight	rope‐
walker	 by	 putting	 it	 in	 a	 perpetually	 unstable,	 perpetually	 broken	
equilibrium...	(BN,	59)	
In	different	words	then,	the	waiter	is	attempting	a	project	of	sincerity.	As	Sartre	says,	‘he	
is	playing	at	being	a	waiter	in	a	cafe’,	and	he	‘plays	with	his	condition	in	order	to	realize	
it.’	(BN,	59)	Occupying	nominally	the	position	of	a	waiter,	he	is	acting	in	such	a	way	as	to	
somehow	make	this	constitute	what	he	is	in	a	more	fundamental	sense.	But	what	exactly	
is	the	nature	of	this	attempt	to	be	a	waiter	in	this	way?	And	what	does	it	reveal	about	
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man’s	 non‐self‐identity	 and	 his	 sincerity?	 We	 can	 begin	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 waiter’s	
attempted	‘sincerity’,	his	efforts	to	coincide	with	the	being	of	a	waiter,	does	not	mean	he	
seeks	to	make	of	himself	in	a	straightforward	sense	a	thing	in‐itself.	That	is,	he	does	not	
seek	to	make	himself	exist	literally	like	an	object	or	automaton.		
	
As	such	then,	we	reject	the	claim	of	Hartmann,	inferred	here,	that	‘Sincerity	is	simply	the	
project	of	making	my	whole	self	an	in‐itself.’16	For,	to	attempt	to	be	a	waiter	here	does	not	
mean,	as	Phillips	also	suggests,	‘To	say	“My	life	is	to	wait	at	table.”17	In	other	words,	even	
at	the	moment	I	am	involved	in	this	‘act’,	to	make	this	effort	does	not	mean	attempting	to	
believe	 I	 am	 ‘nothing	other’	 than	 this	waiter.	 It	 does	not	mean	 to	 subsume	my	entire	
existence	in	that	role.	Indeed,	attempting	to	be	this	waiter	I	could	still	also	be	aware,	for	
example,	of	my	existence	as	a	husband,	father,	or	an	aspiring	actor,	or	even	of	my	time	off	
afterwards.	Likewise,	my	efforts	to	live	up	to	a	certain	role	do	not,	as	McCulloch	argues,	
‘represent	 attempts	 to	 become	 absorbed	 in	 the	 role,	 and	 so	 to	 enjoy	 a	 thing‐like,	
choiceless	existence.’18	This	is	because,	in	employing	the	‘dance’	of	the	waiter,	I	do	not	
thereby	assert	that	I	am	determined	solely	to	be	a	waiter,	or	that	this	is	all	that	I	could	
ever	do.	In	fact,	even	in	attempting	to	be	a	waiter	we	could	still	be	aware	of	a	potential	
future	choice	to	change	profession.	
	
So	then,	what	does	the	waiter’s	attempt	to	be	a	waiter	mean?	That	is,	what	does	it	mean	
if	we	reject	these	possibilities,	which	centre	on	him	becoming	simplistically	a	thing	in‐
itself?	 We	 can	 begin	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 by	 observing	 that	 although	 this	 is	 a	
particularly	explicit	case	of	the	project	of	sincerity	it	is	by	no	means	exceptional.	In	other	
words,	 not	 only,	 as	Phillips	 has	 observed,	 is	 the	 behaviour	 Sartre	 describes	 the	norm	
amongst	waiters,19	but,	as	Sartre	says,	‘This	obligation	is	not	different	from	that	which	is	
imposed	on	all	tradesmen.’	(BN,	59)	And	what	this	means	is	that	we	begin	to	understand	
the	waiter	in	terms	of	a	more	ubiquitous,	if	unacknowledged,	phenomenon.	For,	what	we	
find	in	all	these	cases	and	in	all	jobs	is	a	more	subtle	effort	which	is	simply	about	‘being’	
                                                            
16	Hartmann,	Sartre’s	Ontology,	56	
17	Phillips,	‘Bad	Faith	and	Sartre’s	Waiter’,	27	
18	McCulloch,	Using	Sartre,	58	
19	Phillips,	‘Bad	Faith	and	Sartre’s	Waiter’	27,	24‐25	
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that	thing	in	a	more	familiar	and	everyday	sense.	And	what	we	mean	here	is	indicated	by	
Sartre	 when	 he	 says,	 regarding	 the	 waiter,	 that	 ‘He	 knows	 well	 what	 it	 ‘means:’	 the	
obligation	 of	 getting	 up	 at	 five	 o’clock,	 of	 sweeping	 the	 floor	 of	 the	 shop	 before	 the	
restaurant	opens,	of	starting	the	coffee	pot	going	etc.’	(BN,	59‐60)	In	different	words	then,	
it	is	not	that	the	waiter	is	enacting	some	elaborate	deceit	or	‘act’	in	his	efforts	here.	Rather,	
he	does	indeed	perform	all	these	duties,	and	exists	as	a	waiter	in	an	ordinary	human	way,	
which	takes	up	part	of	his	life.	That	is	to	say,	he	seeks	to	be	a	waiter	in	the	same	way	that	
I	might	 say	ordinarily	 ‘I	 am	a	 student’,	 or	 ‘I	 am	a	 teacher.’	And	as	 such	 therefore,	 the	
waiter’s	attempt	to	be	a	waiter	 is	 just	a	variation	of	what	we	all	do.	In	short,	what	the	
waiter	is	doing	here	is	a	variation	of	what	we	all	do	when	we	believe	a	particular	role	
somehow	gives	content	to,	or	is	a	‘real’	part	of,	our	lives.	
	
Yet,	the	critical	point	is	that	it	is	precisely	this	everyday	sense	of	‘being’	which	necessarily	
eludes	 us.	 For,	 as	 Sartre	 argues,	 such	 being	 is	 only	 ever	 a	 form	 or	 ‘ideal’	 perpetually	
escaping	our	grasp.	As	he	says	then,	 ‘It	 is	a	“representation”	for	others	and	for	myself,	
which	means	that	I	can	be	he	only	in	representation.’	(BN,	60)	In	other	words,	there	is	
some	kind	of	real	or	‘solid’	life	of	a	waiter	which	I	can	never	quite	be.	Like	the	waiter	in	
Sartre’s	example	I	can	make	more	of	an	effort	to	adopt	that	role,	to	‘represent’	that	being,	
but	I	thereby	just	confirm	that	this	is	precisely	what	I	am	not.	Further,	this	non‐being	is	
not	just	a	void	or	empty	abstraction.	For,	as	Sartre	says,	‘there	is	no	doubt	that	I	am	in	a	
sense	a	cafe	waiter	‐	otherwise	could	I	not	just	as	well	call	myself	a	diplomat	or	reporter?’	
(Ibid)	And	 in	 this	way	we	can	say	 that	my	non‐being	 is	defined	precisely	by	a	certain	
reality	 and	 ‘closeness’	 of	 that	 ideal.	 It	 is	 like,	 we	 can	 say,	 a	 form	 perpetually	 on	 the	
periphery	of	my	vision.	That	is,	it	is	something	I	feel	like	I	am	always	almost	apprehending	
and	touching,	but	which	nonetheless	always	just	succeeds	in	evading	my	gaze.	
	
Moreover,	as	Sartre	points	out	here,	‘we	are	dealing	with	more	than	mere	social	positions;	
I	am	never	any	one	of	my	attitudes,	any	one	of	my	actions.’	(Ibid)	In	different	words,	what	
we	are	 absent	 from	 in	 this	way	 is	 not	merely	 the	 ‘ideals’	 of	 particular	public	 roles	 or	
positions.	What	 we	 are	 absent	 from	 is	 instead	 everything	 which	 can	 be	 said	 to	 give	
substance	to	our	lives.	As	Sartre	says	then,	‘Perpetually	absent	to	my	body,	to	my	acts,	I	
am	despite	myself	that	‘divine	absence’	of	which	Valéry	speaks.’(Ibid)	And	our	body	acts	
as	a	particularly	relevant	example	of	the	point	here.	For,	as	a	phenomenological	account	
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of	the	body	reveals,	we	can	never	actually	fully	grasp	the	character	of	our	own	physical	
appearance.20	Even	though	I	ought	to	be	better	acquainted	with	this	than	anyone,	and	
might	spend	hours	each	day	in	the	mirror,	what	I	actually	look	like,	for	myself,	can	never	
quite	be	fixed.	Likewise,	in	another	example,	Sartre	argues	this	strange	absence	from	the	
‘ideal’	 of	 being	 applies	 to	 our	 emotions.	 As	 he	 says,	 citing	melancholy	 here,	 ‘sadness	
perpetually	 haunts	my	 consciousness	 [of]	 being	 sad,	 but	 it	 as	 a	 value	which	 I	 cannot	
realize;	it	stands	as	a	regulative	meaning	of	my	sadness...’	(BN,	61)	In	other	words,	as	we	
saw	with	the	waiter,	it	is	not	a	case	of	saying	that	in	a	straightforward	sense	I	am	not	sad.	
My	sadness	is	on	one	level	real,	and	I	feel	it,	as	opposed	to	feeling	happy	or	bored,	and	it	
‘haunts	 my	 consciousness.’	 However,	 as	 with	 the	 ‘ideal’	 of	 the	 waiter,	 my	 sadness	 is	
something	which	nonetheless	 is	always	 just	outside	my	grasp.	Like	my	sense	of	 joy	or	
regret	it	is	something,	that	is,	which	I	can	never	really	 feel	in	myself;	something	which	
always	seems	to	be	given	under	the	auspices	of	a	certain	pretence.	
	
5.	The	impossibility	of	the	ideal	applied	to	belief	
But	to	return,	where	does	all	this	leave	our	discussion	of	sincerity	and	man’s	non‐being?	
We	 can	 say	 that	 an	 elaboration	 of	 the	 former	 from	 the	 waiter	 example,	 has	 shown	
sincerity	is	‘...a	task	impossible	to	achieve,	of	which	the	very	meaning	is	in	contradiction	
with	the	structure	of	my	consciousness.’	 (BN,	62)	 In	different	words	then,	and	against	
McCulloch	who	argues	sincerity	is	possible	in	certain	cases,21	the	attempt	to	be	what	one	
is	 is	 universally	 impossible.	 And	 further,	 we	 can	 say,	 this	 impossibility	 is	 part	 of	 the	
structure	 of	 our	 being.	 As	 Sartre	 states,	 ‘this	 impossibility	 is	 not	 hidden	 from	
consciousness;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	the	very	stuff	of	consciousness;	it	is	the	embarrassing	
constraint	which	we	constantly	experience;	it	is	our	incapacity	to	recognise	ourselves,	to	
constitute	ourselves	as	being	what	we	are.’	(BN,	62)	Consequently,	we	can	say	that	an	
investigation	of	sincerity	has	disclosed,	 in	a	new	way,	 the	nature	of	man’s	 ‘non‐being’.	
That	is,	it	has	revealed	the	nature	of	that	phenomenon	to	which	our	first	concrete	example	
of	the	coquette	had	led	us.		For	sincerity	has	revealed	man’s	strange	absence	from	himself	
as	fundamentally	linked	to	his	most	basic	project.	In	short,	we	can	see	that	an	impossible	
                                                            
20	See	BN,	Part	III,	Chapter	2	
21	McCulloch,	Using	Sartre,	62	
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attempt	to	be	what	we	are	not,	in	trying	to	coincide	with	the	elusive	‘ideals’	of	our	being,	
is	what	characterises	the	very	effort	of	our	existence.	
	
Yet	continuing,	if	this	‘incapacity	to	recognise	ourselves’	has	been	revealed,	where	in	turn	
does	this	 leave	our	discussion	of	self‐deception?	Where	does	this	 leave	our	attempt	to	
understand	how	a	contradictory	state	of	consciousness	can	be	maintained	and	thus	how	
the	puzzle	of	self‐deception	can	be	resolved?		The	answer	is	that	it	provides	a	crucial	part	
of	the	solution.	For	if	consciousness,	as	seen	with	sincerity,	is	characterised	by	a	continual	
failure	entirely	 to	coincide	with	an	 ideal	of	being	then	this	must	 too	apply	to	belief.	 In	
short,	our	beliefs,	and	our	ability	to	believe,	must	too	be	afflicted	with	this	failure,	 ‘the	
divine	absence’,	inherent	in	our	entire	existence.	And	this	is	what	Sartre	describes	in	his	
final	section	on	bad	faith.	For,	as	he	says	there,	‘Every	belief	is	a	belief	that	falls	short;	one	
never	wholly	believes	what	one	believes.’	 (BN,	69)	 In	other	words,	when	we	consider	
closely	our	belief	we	realise	there	is	an	absence	at	its	heart.	We	realise,	when	we	look	
carefully	 enough,	 that	 I	 cannot	 be	 genuinely	 sincere	 about	 any	 of	my	 beliefs.	 For	we	
apprehend	 that	 behind	 even	 the	 most	 ‘heart	 felt’	 belief	 is	 a	 failure	 or	 a	 strange	
incongruity.	And,	as	such,	belief	in	this	way	resembles	every	other	aspect	of	our	existence.	
That	is,	we	can	imagine	ourselves	‘believing’	in	the	manner	that	a	character	in	a	novel	or	
another	person	might,	but	fundamentally	we	sense	that	such	belief	does	not	really	apply	
to	us.	
	
So,	to	elaborate,	a	character	in	a	novel	might	seem	to	be	defined	by	their	belief.	That	is	to	
say	that	the	sincerity	of	their	belief	seems	to	consist	in	the	way	it	is	a	real	and	substantial	
part	of	who	they	are.	And	indeed	this	is	the	common	sense	view	of	the	matter.	In	other	
words,	the	ordinarily	accepted	view	is	that	beliefs	adhere	to,	and	stem	from,	us	like	height	
or	the	colour	of	our	hair.	In	this	way	we	are	said	to	‘hold’	beliefs,	and	carry	them	with	us.	
However,	on	the	Sartrean	picture,	belief	is	always	afflicted	by	a	strange	elusiveness.	As	
such,	just	as	we	cannot	quite	be	a	waiter,	a	husband,	or	any	other	ideal	of	being,	then	we	
can	never	wholly	identify	with	any	particular	belief.	The	moment	we	attempt	to	lay	claim	
to,	and	thematise,	belief,	rather	we	are	put	at	a	distance	from	it.	It	is,	as	with	the	waiter,	
then,	as	if	on	a	certain	level	it	is	an	act,	as	if	the	person	holding	or	asserting	the	belief	is	
not	really	oneself.	In	short,	it	is	as	if,	on	the	level	of	an	existential	relation,	we	try	to	play	
the	 role	 of	 ‘believing’,	 but	 always	 find	 ourselves	 as	 already,	 imperceptibly,	 having	
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surpassed	 it.	 And	 moreover,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 something	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 intuit	 in	
experience.	For	whilst	a	full	elaboration	of	this	point	depends	upon	further	analysis	of	
‘non‐being’,	we	can	say	that	this	is	something	a	sensitive	phenomenology	of	belief	is	still	
able	 to	 discern.	 In	 other	words,	 if	 we	 set	 aside	 ingrained	 assumptions	 regarding	 the	
necessity	or	importance	of	genuinely	holding	beliefs	we	find	belief	is	indeed	menaced	by	
this	kind	of	failure.	And	we	begin	to	see	further,	how	this	then	ties	in	to	a	view	of	the	self	
as	‘a	sort	of	escape	from	the	self...’	(BN,	25).	Put	differently,	with	this	we	begin	to	discern	
the	sense	in	which,	for	Sartre,	the	self	is	a	perpetual	flight	from	anything	which	gives	self‐
hood	any	definite	substance	or	form.	
	
In	any	case,	returning	to	our	argument,	this	last	conclusion	about	the	elusive	nature	of	
belief	helps	to	address	our	problem	only	when	combined	with	another	point.	And	this	
point,	which	gets	us	to	the	heart	of	self‐deception,	is	that	we	are	necessarily	aware	of	this	
failure	of	belief.	That	is,	as	Sartre	says,	 ‘To	believe	is	to	know	that	one	believes,	and	to	
know	that	one	believes	is	no	longer	to	believe.’	(Ibid)	Just	as,	then,	the	impossibility	of	
sincerity	in	general	‘is	the	very	stuff	of	consciousness’	(BN,	62),	so	too	is	this	failure	of	
belief	something	of	which	we	are	always	implicitly	aware.	And	the	reason	why	these	two	
points	combined	help	us	here	goes	back	to	our	example	of	the	coquette.	In	particular,	the	
reason	they	direct	us	to	a	solution	goes	back	to	a	 ‘strategy’	we	saw	adopted	by	her	to	
disguise	awareness	of	her	body	from	herself.	For	just	as	there	she	did	this	by	‘playing’	
with	awareness	of	the	two	different	kinds	of	non‐being,	we	see	the	same	‘game’	at	play	
with	regards	to	two	different	senses	of	belief.	This	is	because,	as	Sartre	explains,	
	
Every	belief	is	a	belief	that	falls	short;	one	never	wholly	believes	what	
one	believes.	Consequently	the	primitive	project	of	bad	faith	is	only	the	
utilization	of	this	self‐destruction	of	the	fact	of	consciousness.	If	every	
belief	in	good	faith	is	an	impossible	belief,	then	there	is	a	place	for	every	
impossible	belief.	My	inability	to	believe	 that	I	am	courageous	will	not	
discourage	me	 since	 every	 belief	 involves	 not	 quite	 believing.	 I	 shall	
define	this	impossible	belief	as	my	belief.	(BN,	69)	
In	other	words,	to	start,	what	we	have	as	with	the	coquette	is	two	different	senses	of	‘non‐
belief’,	or	 ‘impossible	belief.’	First	of	all	 then	there	 is	the	ordinary	sense	of	 impossible	
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belief,	something	I	know	in	the	more	mundane	sense	not	to	be	the	case.	That	is,	there	is	
that	 sense	of	non‐belief	applying	 to	particular	 beliefs	 such	as	 ‘I	 am	courageous.’	Then	
there	is	the	second	sense	of	‘impossibility’.	This	is	the	sense	of	non‐belief	which	we	have	
just	revealed	in	our	discussion,	applying	to	all	belief,	and	the	impossibility	of	ever	truly	
believing	anything.	And	what	the	consciousness	in	self‐deception	does,	given	its	implicit	
awareness	of	this	second	mode	of	‘non‐belief’,	is	to	conflate	the	two	senses.	That	is	to	say,	
it	uses	the	impossibility	of	belief	in	the	second,	‘existential’	sense	to	dismiss	as	impossible	
both	kinds	of	belief.	As	Sartre	says,	‘It	has	disarmed	all	beliefs	in	advance‐	those	which	it	
would	like	to	take	hold	of	and,	by	the	same	stroke,	the	others,	those	which	it	wishes	to	
flee.	In	willing	this	self‐destruction	of	belief...it	ruins	the	beliefs	which	are	opposed	to	it,	
which	reveal	themselves	as	being	only	belief.’	(BN,	70)	What	it	does	then	is	to	destroy	all	
beliefs	in	the	first,	‘mundane’	sense	by	judging	them	according	to	the	ideal	of	sincere	belief.	
All	 particular	 beliefs	 thus	 now	 become	 equally	 impossible.	 However	 then,	 having	
destroyed	ordinary	belief	by	seeing	it	in	terms	of	sincere	belief	it	now	moves	back	to	the	
mundane	mode.	 That	 is,	 it	 now	 wants	 to	 re‐instate	 the	 truth	 of	 whichever	 beliefs	 it	
chooses,	but	now	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	belief.	And	it	can	do	this	since	all	such	ordinary	
belief	has	now	been	reduced	to	the	same	level.	
	
Like	the	born‐again	Christian’s	sin	then,	the	belief	of	bad	faith	reduces	all	belief	to	nought,	
so	that	it	can	resurrect,	with	awareness	of	the	futility	of	all	belief,	whatever	it	chooses.	
Bad	faith	thus	exploits	the	fact	that	we	already	essentially	feel	ourselves	playing	a	game	
‘of	mirror	and	reflection’	(BN,	66)	regarding	belief,	in	order	to	believe	what	is	convenient.	
And	 in	 this	 way	 we	 can	 see	 the	 connection	 to	 our	 central	 question.	 That	 is,	 we	 can	
understand	with	this	how	the	impossibility	of	genuine	belief,	and	our	implicit	awareness	
of	this,	allows	for	self‐deception.	For	if	we	sense	that	all	belief	somehow	‘falls	short’	then	
my	adoption	of	a	contradictory	belief	can	be	maintained.	In	different	words,	if	we	sense	
somehow	 that	 all	 belief	 is	 a	 ‘game’	 anyway	 I	 can	 believe	 even	 that	 which	 appears	
impossible.	And	furthermore	it	does	not	matter	that	this	strategy	of	sliding	between	the	
two	senses	of	belief	is	itself	in	bad	faith.	In	short,	it	does	not	matter,	as	Sartre	says,	that	‘I	
shall	not	be	able	to	hide	from	myself	that	I	believe	in	order	not	to	believe	and	that	I	do	
not	believe	in	order	 to	believe.’	(BN,	69‐70)	Or	put	another	way,	it	matters	not	that	an	
assertion	of	belief,	my	actually	believing	a	contradictory	idea,	is	justified	precisely	by	first	
saying	that	nothing	can	be	believed	or	asserted.		For,	as	Sartre	makes	clear,	bad	faith	is	in	
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bad	faith	right	down	to	its	very	roots.	As	he	says,	‘bad	faith	must	be	itself	in	bad	faith.’	
(BN,	68)	And	there	is	then	no	underlying	‘reason’	therefore	to	be	appealed	to;	our	refusal	
to	be	honest	in	our	relation	to	belief	runs	to	the	very	core	of	our	being.	
Moreover,	we	can	expand	on	this	point	when	we	consider	again	what	the	nature	of	the	
self	is	for	Sartre.	For	we	can	say,	to	start,	returning	to	a	claim	made	by	Fingarette,	that	
immediate	self‐deception	occurs	on	the	basis	of,	what	Sartre	calls,	‘the	spontaneity	of	the	
non‐reflective	cogito.’	(BN,	xl)	That	is,	we	are	not	here	talking	about	a	reflective	‘choice’	
regarding	how	or	what	to	deceive	oneself	about.	Our	intentions,	or	what	is	desirable	to	
believe	in	a	given	moment,	and	the	strategy	for	accomplishing	this,	rather	takes	place	on	
a	 level	 prior	 to	 reflective	 awareness.	 And,	 as	 well	 as	 what	 we	 desire,	 say	 avoiding	 a	
decision,	what	we	 are	pre‐reflectively	 aware	of	 is	 also	 the	nature	of	 the	 self.	 In	 other	
words,	we	are	aware	of	the	self	as	a	perpetual	flight	from	what	is,	from	its	facticity.	Or,	as	
Sartre	puts	it,	we	are	aware	of	the	self,	as	‘an	ideal	distance	within	the	immanence	of	the	
subject	in	relation	to	himself,	a	way	of	not	being	his	own	coincidence,	of	escaping	identity...’	
(BN,	77)	And	we	can	now	see	how	this	then	expands	on	our	previous	point	regarding	the	
possibility	of	self‐deception.	This	is	because,	in	a	broader	sense,	if	we	are	implicitly	aware	
of	 existing	 in	 this	 ambiguous	 liminal	 state	 of	 flight	 we	 can	 utilise	 this	 to	 maintain	
contradictions.	What	this	means	is	that	if	we	exist	without	substance,	perpetually	caught	
between	definite	modes	of	being,	then	we	are	implicitly	aware	of	the	difficulty	of	properly	
apprehending	 anything.	 And	 this	 difficulty,	 pre‐reflectively	 intuited,	 opens	 the	 space	
further	for	adopting	beliefs	which	intentionally	resist	consistent	meaning.	In	short,	it	is	
the	very	difficulty	of	being	honest	regarding	the	elusiveness	of	the	self	and	its	connection	
to	the	world,	that	makes	contradictory	belief	in	relation	to	self,	and	hence	self‐deception,	
so	achievable.	
6.	Self‐deception	and	the	self	
Yet,	concluding,	where	does	this	now	put	us	regarding	the	central	question	of	our	paper?	
That	 is,	where	are	we	 left	 in	 terms	of	what	we	said	was	 the	connection	between	self‐
deception	and	the	self?	For,	did	we	not	suggest	at	the	beginning	that	we	could	shed	new	
light	on	the	self	by	pursuing	an	analysis	of	this	phenomenon?	We	did.	And	we	also	began	
by	observing	that	since	‘I	must	aim	at	the	object	of	my	flight	in	order	to	flee	it’	(BN,	43)	it	
is	difficult	to	see	how	the	lie	to	oneself	can	succeed.	In	other	words,	pointed	out	was	how	
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prima	facie	hard	it	is	to	grasp	how	we	can	both	be	the	author	of	the	lie,	and	be	taken	in	by	
it.	Thus	we	said	that	an	understanding	of	the	self	through	self‐deception	would	have	to	
emerge	from	attempts	to	solve	this	puzzle,	or	paradox.	And	we	began	in	this	enterprise	
by	 looking	 at	 some	 familiar	 responses	 to	 the	 problem.	 As	 such	we	 encountered,	 and	
rejected,	 the	 Freudian	 and	 deflationary	 accounts	 respectively.	 Likewise,	 though	 an	
advance,	Fingarette’s	approach,	based	on	the	idea	that	‘we	can	take	account	of	something	
without	necessarily	 focusing	our	attention	on	 it’22	was	 itself	 seen	as	 limited.	This	was	
because	it	still	conceived	self‐deception	passively.	In	different	words,	it	still	ignored	the	
fact	that	regarding	self‐deception	‘one	is	not	infected	with	it…but	consciousness	affects	
itself.	’	(BN,	49)	And	it	was	to	grasp	then	this	active	and	immediate	self‐deceiving	that	we	
looked	to	describe	more	thoroughly	what	was	going	in	a	situation	where	it	was	actually	
experienced.	In	short,	we	looked	to	give	a	concrete	phenomenological	description	of	self‐
deception.	For,	as	Heidegger	says,	‘the	term	“phenomenology”	expresses	a	maxim	which	
can	be	formulated	as	“To	the	things	themselves!”23,	and	we	hoped	to	find	a	way	out	of	the	
puzzle	by	this	method.	
Consequently	we	gave	a	phenomenological	account	of	a	woman	engaged	in	a	project	of	
self‐deception.	And	we	found	that	it	was	‘the	double	property	of	the	human	being’	(BN,	
56),	the	fact	man	both	is	and	is	not	his	facticity	and	transcendence,	that	allowed	her	to	
deceive	herself	there.	In	short,	we	saw	that	it	was	something	about	man’s	non‐identity	
with	 himself	 that	 allowed	 self‐deception	 to	 take	 place.	 Assuming	 therefore	 that	 ‘non‐
identity’	might	hold	the	key	to	grasping	self‐deception,	we	thus	next	looked	at	sincerity.	
This	was	because,	as	Sartre	said,	 ‘examination	of	the	idea	of	sincerity,	the	antithesis	of	
bad	 faith,	will	be	very	 instructive	 in	 this	connection.’	 (BN,	58)	That	 is,	 to	explore	self‐
deception	further,	we	looked	at	this	paradigmatic	project	of	trying	to	deny	one’s	non‐self‐
identity,	and	achieve	identity	with	oneself.		
	
Furthermore	we	did	 this	by	 looking	at	 another	 concrete	 example.	 In	other	words,	we	
looked	at	the	instance	of	sincerity	wherein	a	waiter	is	‘playing	at	being	a	waiter	in	a	cafe.’	
(BN,	59)	However	we	disagreed	with	 the	 familiar	 interpretations	of	what	 the	waiter’s	
                                                            
22	Fingarette,	Self‐Deception,	164	
23	Heidegger,	Being	and	Time,	50	
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attempt	to	be	a	waiter	represented.	That	is	to	say,	we	disagreed	with	the	idea	that	he	was	
trying	simplistically	to	become	an	object	or	a	‘thing	in‐itself.’	Instead	we	argued,	what	the	
waiter	was	trying	to	live	up	to	was	a	more	everyday	‘ideal’	of	being	that	people	have	in	
relation	to	all	aspects	of	their	lives.	And	it	is	this	which	the	waiter	could	never	quite	be.	
Moreover	 finally,	 we	 said	 that	 it	 was	 this	 non‐identity,	 ‘...our	 incapacity	 to	 recognise	
ourselves,	to	constitute	ourselves	as	being	what	we	are’	(Ibid)	which	in	turn	allowed	us	
to	understand	the	nature	of	self‐deception.	For	this	sense	of	not	truly	ever	being	able	to	
realise	an	ideal,	must	apply	to	belief	as	well.	In	different	words,	we	saw	that	we	can	never	
quite	believe,	and	hence,	as	Sartre	says,	‘Every	belief	is	a	belief	that	falls	short.’	(BN,	69)	
And	this	 last	point,	as	we	have	seen,	provides	a	solution	to	the	 initial	problem	of	self‐
deception	posed.	For	by	conflating	the	impossibility	of	belief	in	this	‘ideal’	sense	with	such	
impossibility	in	an	ordinary	sense,	we	can	maintain	self‐deception.	In	sum,	by	applying	
the	former	mode	of	impossibility	to	the	latter	we	can	destroy	all	ordinary	belief,	and	then	
resurrect	in	a	mode	of	pseudo‐belief	whatever	we	wish.	
	
Concluding	therefore	we	have	seen	that	with	this	a	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	self‐deception	
has	been	intimated.	For,	we	witnessed	how	it	was	possible,	by	utilising	awareness	of	the	
failure	of	belief,	to	maintain	even	contradictory	beliefs	and	states	of	consciousness.	And	
in	this	sense	we	saw	how	it	was	possible	to	believe	the	very	‘lie’	we	were	telling,	even	at	
the	moment	we	were	aware	of	telling	it.	Yet,	returning	to	our	original	concern,	has	this	
analysis	 then	 revealed	much	about	 the	 self?	Has	 this	 account	of	how	self‐deception	 is	
possible	shed	new	light	on	the	nature	of	self‐hood	as	promised?	In	one	sense,	certainly	it	
seems	that	it	has.	This	is	the	case	since	in	the	process	of	our	analysis	we	have	seen	that	
the	type	of	being	for	whom	self‐deception	is	possible	is	one	characterised	by	a	certain	
kind	of	‘non‐being’.	In	other	words,	we	have	seen	that	it	is	the	fact	that	man	must	exist	
‘...in	the	perpetual	mode	of	detachment	from	what	is...’	(BN,	35),	lacking	any	substantial	
or	present	self,	which	allows	self‐deception	to	take	place.	And	this	is	significant.		
	
This	is	because	whilst	the	exact	meaning	of	this	‘detachment’	requires	further	analysis,	it	
has	at	least	suggested	that	the	self	is	far	stranger	than	thought.	That	is	to	say,	that	the	self	
must	be	‘a	sort	of	escape	from	the	self...’	(BN,	25)	runs	counter	to	all	ordinary,	common‐
sense	intuitions	of	what	we	are.	And	in	this	way	our	analysis	of	self‐deception	has,	we	can	
say,	also	laid	the	ground	for	a	more	disturbing	possibility.	This	further,	goes	to	the	heart	
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of	our	self‐understanding.	For,	it	is	suggested	that	we	are	deceiving	ourselves	not	merely	
about	particular	unpleasant	truths	or	problems	but	about	the	very	relation	we	have	to	
our	own	self.	 It	 is,	as	Nietzsche	says	then,	 that	 ‘We	remain	strange	to	ourselves	out	of	
necessity.’24	Or	put	another	way,	it	is	as	if	there	must	be	something	about	the	structure	of	
the	world	which	compels	us	to	so	systematically	elide	the	truth	of	who	we	are.	And	it	is	
this	problem	then	which	can	serve	as	the	theme	for	further	research.	In	short,	it	is	this	
question	of	how	man	comes	to	be	so	thoroughly	deceived	about	himself,	which	can	serve	
as	the	thread	in	future	phenomenological	analyses	of	the	self.	
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